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This paper examines how diﬀerent electoral rules aﬀect the lo-
cation decisions of ﬁrms through the eﬀect on regional policy. The
equilibrium location of industry in the economically smaller (larger)
region is higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections. The stan-
dard prediction in the economic geography literature, that the larger
region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced, no longer
holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the smaller
region is increasing in the level of regional integration. As trade is in-
creasingly liberalized, the economy features a reversed core-periphery
equilibrium. This result holds under both electoral rules. However,
ﬁrms locate to the smaller region at a relatively higher rate in the
case of majoritarian voting, hence, the reversed equilibrium occurs
for a relatively lower level of regional integration with majoritarian
elections. Empirical evidence shows that the model is consistent with
qualitative features of the data, and the results are robust to an instru-
mental variable strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity
of the electoral rule.
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Government grants inﬂuence where ﬁrms locate and how the presence of ag-
glomeration externalities interacts with regional policy. At the same time,
there is a large consensus in the literature that economic policy is deter-
mined by the interaction of politicians, interest groups, and voters. Political
science links policy choices to fundamental constitutional features such as, for
example, the electoral rule employed. Given this view, can institutional ar-
rangements provide an explanation for the location decisions of ﬁrms through
its eﬀect on the determination of regional policy? If so, the constitutional
framework is of economic importance for newly emerging democracies, but
also for more consolidated democratic regimes seeking to change their elec-
tion scheme. The current paper aims to answer this question by examining
how regional policy aﬀects the geographic concentration of ﬁrm activity un-
der diﬀerent electoral rules.
While the speciﬁc question of how the constitutional design inﬂuence
the economic geography has been neglected, much of the work on compara-
tive political economy studies aspects of ﬁscal policy. Persson and Tabellini
(1999), for example, relate the size and composition of government spending
to the political system. Applying the probabilistic voting model adapted by
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), they show that majoritarian, as opposed to
proportional, elections increase competition between parties by focusing it
into some key electoral districts containing the most responsive voters. This
leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and
larger government.
Using the framework of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Robert-Nicoud and
Sbergami (2004) examine the political economy of the distribution of regional
subsidies and the eﬀect on the location decisions of ﬁrms. They argue that
the population in smaller regions is more politically homogenous and, for
this reason, politicians will ﬁnd that a given subsidy level can buy more
votes when the subsidies are distributed to ﬁrms based in these areas, where
there are relatively more swing voters. Taking such voter characteristics into
account when determining regional policy, it follows that smaller regions
can attract a more than proportional share of industry compared to what is
implied by standard geography models.
The current paper combines features of the models on how political in-
stitutions aﬀect economic outcomes with a small but growing literature on
2the political economy of regional policy and industrial location.1 In doing
so, it shows that the agglomeration of economic activity depends on how the
electoral system aﬀects the political competition when regional policy is de-
termined. Speciﬁcally, in line with the aforementioned assumption that the
rural and smaller region (the South) is characterized by a relatively higher
level of ideological homogeneity than the urban and larger region (the North),
it is shown that the equilibrium location of industry in the South (North) is
higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections.
The economic setting applied in the paper, with asymmetric-sized re-
gions, where capital is inter-regionally mobile, gives rise to the home market
eﬀect (Krugman, 1980). That is, as trade barriers are gradually lowered,
the allocation of industry shifts towards the larger region. In the absence
of an endogenous regional policy, further liberalization continues to bene-
ﬁt the larger region until all industry agglomerates in the North. However,
taking into account the institutional structure of the political competition
when allocating subsidies to industrial ﬁrms, this standard prediction does
not necessarily hold.
Applying the probabilistic voting model under proportional and majori-
tarian voting as in Persson and Tabellini (1999), whether the North or the
South is subsidized on net, is shown to depend on the ideological disposition
of the electorate. Given the notion that the social and economic activities
are more homogenous in smaller regions, the oﬃce-motiviated political candi-
dates adjust their policy platforms to the economic interest of the electorate
in the South; that is, they net subsidize manufacturing production in this
region. This holds under both electoral rules.2 When trade is liberalized,
subsidies to manufacturing production become relatively more eﬃcient in at-
1See for example Persson and Tabellini (2002) for a survey of the literature on compar-
ative political economy. Papers on the political economy of the new economic geography
include for example Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2004); Wiberg (2010), who develops
a lobbying model to explain the distribution of regional subsidies and the eﬀect on the
location of industry; and Wiberg (2011), who analyzes the location of manufacturing ac-
tivities when regional policy is determined by each region’s relative propensity to vote. In
a study somewhat related to this issue, Henderson and Wang (2007) examine how democ-
ratization aﬀects urbanization in an endogenous growth context. As they show, increasing
democratization levels the playing ﬁeld across the urban hierarchy, increasing the growth
in city numbers, while reducing the population size of cities.
2This is consistent with previous research: according to Homburg (1997), population
size was signiﬁcantly negatively related to the allocation of regional funds within the
European Union in 1992.
3tracting industrial activity; hence, the equilibrium location of industry in the
South is increasing in the level of economic integration. As trade is increas-
ingly liberalized, the economy eventually features a reversed core-periphery
equilibrium where all ﬁrms reside in the South.
It is further argued that the South obtains a relatively higher (lower) level
of subsidies with majoritarian (proportional) voting. This in turn implies
that ﬁrms locate at relatively higher (lower) rates to the South as trade costs
are lowered under majoritarian (proportional) representation, and that the
reversed core-periphery equilibrium occurs for a relatively lower (higher) level
of regional integration. The reason for this can be explained as follows.
The population in each region consists of three groups of voters: the
rich, the middle class, and the poor; the middle class is the largest voter
group and on average ideologically neutral. As in the model of Persson and
Tabellini (1999), under a majoritarian system the electoral competition is
stiﬀer, because the candidates are relatively more focused on the voter group
with the least average ideological bias, in this case, the middle-class. Since
the election outcome is more sensitive to policy, these voters obtain a regional
policy closer to their ideal point as compared to proportional representation.
As a result, the larger (lower) is the South’s density of ideologically neutral
voters in the middle class relative to that of the rich and the poor compared
to that of the North, the larger (lower) are the regional transfers to the South
under majoritarian representation. Following the notion of Robert-Nicoud
and Sbergami (2004), when the North becomes relatively larger, it is assumed
that the relative ideological homogeneity of the South increases. Speciﬁcally,
the homogeneity among a voter group of the South is proportional to the
homogeneity and the relative size of the corresponding voter group of the
North. For example, as the middle class of the North becomes relatively
larger compared to that of the South, the relative ideological homogeneity of
the middle-class voters of the South increases. This correspondence, and the
fact that the middle class constitutes the largest voter group in the national
electorate, thereby potentially including more swing voters, imply a larger
fraction of ideologically neutral voters in the middle class of the South relative
to the North. In other words, when the North becomes relatively larger, the
number of swing voters in the middle-class of the South increases by more
than the increase among the rich and the poor in the South. This gives rise
to an ideological bias in the electorate of the smaller region, that leads the
political parties to allocate a relatively higher (lower) level of subsides to
the South under the majoritarian (proportional) electoral rule. And when
4the candidates distribute a relatively higher (lower) level of ﬁrm subsidies
to the South under majoritarian (proportional) voting, the subsidy-included
relative return to capital increases (decreases) in this region, which increases
(decreases) the number of ﬁrms located in the South.
Empirical evidence from a cross-country sample of yearly averaged data
over the period 1993-2007 for 88 countries supports the view that economi-
cally smaller and rural (larger and urban) regions are relatively larger (smaller)
under majoritarian institutions compared to proportional elections. The em-
pirical framework also conﬁrms the prediction that economic activity shifts
to smaller regions as trade costs are lowered. This is an interesting result
since empirical research, not controlling for the electoral rule, ﬁnds a loca-
tion disadvantage of rural areas as inter-regional trade is liberalized (see for
example Hanson (2005)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the economic geography framework, and solves for the equilibrium location
of industry when the regional policy variable is taken as exogenous. Section 3
introduces the political economy dimension, and solves for the policy instru-
ment under proportional and majoritarian representation. In Section 4, the
comparative subsidy and location equilibria are deﬁned. Section 5 discusses
the empirical strategy, the data set and tests the theoretical implications of
the model. Section 6 concludes; proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
2 The Economic Model
The economic model uses the Martin and Rogers (1995) framework, which
is based on the Flam and Helpman (1987) version of the Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) model of monopolistic competition.
2.1 Assumptions
There are two regions, two sectors and two factors. Speciﬁcally, the two re-
gions, North (N) and South (S), belong to the same country and are endowed
with two factors, labor (L) and capital (K). The regions are symmetric in
terms of tastes, technology, openness to trade, but diﬀer in their factor en-
dowments; the North is a scaled-up version of the South. Thus, the regions
may be of diﬀerent size, but they have identical capital-labor ratios. In par-
ticular, the North’s endowment of both capital and labor is λ > 1 times the
5South’s endowment. For this reason, λ can be interpreted as the relative
economic strength of the North.
Let the population in each region consists of three distinct groups of
voters, denoted by k = R,M,P, representing the rich, the middle class, and
the poor, respectively. It is assumed that the middle class is the largest
group.
The two sectors are referred to as agriculture (A) and industry, or man-
ufacturing (I). The agricultural sector is assumed to produce a homogenous
good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition using aA units
of labor per unit of output. Labor is the only input and this good is chosen
as a numeraire. The manufacturing sector uses both labor and capital to pro-
duce a diﬀerentiated good under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic
competition. Following Flam and Helpman (1987), the production of each
diﬀerentiated good involves a one-time ﬁxed cost consisting of one unit of K,
and a per-unit-of-output cost of aI units of L. The implied cost function of
each industrial ﬁrm is therefore given by:
π + waIx, (2.1)
where π and w are the reward to capital and labor, and x is the ﬁrm level
output.
Physical capital can move between the regions but capital owners are im-
mobile. Thus, when pressures arise to concentrate production to one region,
capital will move, but its entire reward will be repatriated to its region of
origin. Labor, on the other hand, can move freely between the sectors but
is immobile between the regions. Total supply of capital and labor in the
economy is ﬁxed, with the nation’s endowments denoted by KW and LW.
Since each industrial variety requires one unit of capital, the share of the
nation’s capital stock employed in a single region equals the region’s share
of the national manufacturing sector. Consequently, the North’s share of
industry can be used, i.e., sN ≡
nN
nN+nS, where nN and nS denote the number
of industrial ﬁrms in the North and the South, respectively, to represent the
share of capital employed in the North and the share of all varieties made in
the North.
Output in the agricultural sector is traded at no cost, while inter-regional
trade in the diﬀerentiated output is subject to an iceberg transportation cost.
Hence, in order to sell one unit of the diﬀerentiated good in the other region,
τ > 1 units need to be shipped.







where  k ∈ (0,1) and CA is consumption of the homogenous good. (2.2)
implies that the expenditure shares on industrial products and the agricul-
tural output diﬀer across the voter groups. It is natural, but not crucial for
the results, to assume that  R >  M >  P, i.e., that the rich voters spend
relatively more of their income on industrial goods than the middle class and
the poor. Consumption of manufactures enters the utility function through










where nW = nN + nS denotes the number of industrial varieties consumed,
ﬁxed by the nation’s total supply of capital; ci is the amount of variety i
consumed, and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties.
Assuming that a government can subsidize manufacturing production in
both regions at the same time, these subsidies are proportional to the reward
to capital and distributed on a per-ﬁrm basis independent of output. Since
the one-time ﬁxed cost consists of one unit of K, such subsidies represent a
subsidy to capital. Let πN (πS) denote the before-subsidy reward to capital




1+zN, where θ ∈ R++
and zj ≥ 0 measures the level of per-ﬁrm subsidies proportional to the reward
to capital, awarded to a typical ﬁrm located in region j = N,S. Subsidies
deﬁned in this way thus entitle the ﬁrm to zj units of subsidies per unit of πj.
Clearly, when production in the South is net subsidized, the condition θ > 1
must hold, and when production in the North is net subsidized, the condition
0 < θ < 1 must be fulﬁlled. θ = 1 when no net subsidies are distributed.
The subsidies are paid for by lump-sum taxation, and since each unit of
labor is identiﬁed with an individual, the per-capita tax can be expressed as a
per-unit-of-labor tax. Moreover, the government’s budget is always balanced,
so that the level of taxation depends on the level of subsidies transferred.
Wages are not aﬀected by the subsidies, and since each individual is both a
taxpayer and an owner of capital and labor, on net, the agents’ total incomes
are unaﬀected by the tax-cum-subsidy. Further, with free capital mobility,
7those who receive subsidies earn no more than the individuals who receive
no subsidies, so netting out the tax-cum-subsidy, the agents’ incomes are
unaﬀected by taxation.
By assumption, there are no savings and therefore expenditures equal
disposable income. Consequently, expenditures in region j, Ej, are given by:
Ej = wjLj + ρjKj − TLj, (2.4)
where ρj is the subsidy-included return to capital in region j, and T is the
countrywide lump-sum tax paid by the representative consumer.
2.2 The Economic Equilibrium
The unit factor requirement of the homogenous good is one unit of labor
(aA = 1). This good is freely traded and since it is also chosen as a numeraire,
pA = w = 1 in both regions.
A consumer of group k spends a share  k of his income on manufactures.
Maximizing (2.2), subject to (2.3) and the budget constraint, to obtain the




















for each diﬀerentiated commodity sold in the home and export market, re-
spectively. Without loss of generality, let aI = σ−1
σ ,4 then using w = 1 to
3Diﬀerentiating the proﬁt function, Πi = pici(pi)+p∗
ic∗
i(p∗
























i , solving for the optimal prices gives (2.6) and (2.7).
4This assumption is made for algebraic simplicity and does not aﬀect the results, since
aI does not enter the location condition. aI = σ−1
σ < 1, because σ > 1, implies that less
than one unit of labor is needed to produce one unit of the diﬀerentiated good.
8obtain the pricing rules for ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector: p = 1 and
p∗ = τ.
Since physical capital is only used in the ﬁxed cost component of industrial
production, the reward to capital is the Ricardian surplus of a typical variety,
i.e., the operating proﬁt of a variety. With a ﬁxed capital stock and free entry,
the reward to capital will be bid up to the point where the entire operating
proﬁt goes to capital. Under Dixit-Stiglitz competition, the operating proﬁt
is the value of sales divided by σ; that is, πj =
xj
σ , where xj is the scale of
production of a representative industrial ﬁrm in region j.5
National expenditures, EW, can be written as:
EW = LW + ρWKW − TLW, (2.8)




KW . This means
that with free entry into the industrial sector, the national subsidy-included
reward to capital is the sum of the national operating proﬁt and the level of
subsidies transferred to a representative manufacturing ﬁrm in the economy
(since the government’s budget is always balanced, and the level of taxation




KWσ (see Baldwin et al. [2003]), where   ≡ 1
3
P3
k=1 k, in (2.8) yields EW =
LW +
µEW
σ , which implies that:
EW =
σLW
σ −  
. (2.9)
Likewise, for region j:
Ej =
σLj
σ −  
. (2.10)




LW , where sEj ∈ (0,1) repre-
sents the share of national expenditures of region j, and sEN = 1−sES. Thus,






The domestic and foreign demand function for industry i products, and
the optimal prices give the reward to capital or the operating proﬁt in equi-
5Free entrance implies that proﬁts are eliminated. Employing the proﬁt function from
note 3 for a typical manufacturing ﬁrm in region j, noting that w = 1, aI = σ−1
σ , p = 1,
p∗ = τ, and xj ≡ cj + c∗

































τ1−σ ≡ φ ∈ [0,1] is a measure of the freeness of inter-regional trade, where 0
corresponds to inﬁnite trade barriers and 1 represents free trade. Substituting




sN + φ(1 − sN)
+
φ(1 − sEN)







sN + φ(1 − sN)
+
(1 − sEN)





σ−µ, sN and 1−sN being the North and the South’s share of the
national manufacturing sector. With one unit of capital per variety, sN and
1 − sN are also deﬁned as the regional shares of the national capital stock
employed in the North and the South, respectively.
With perfect capital mobility and when manufacturing production takes
place in both regions, the location condition requires that capital employed
in the North must earn the same subsidy-included rate of return as capital in
the South: πN(1+zN) = πS(1+zS). Given (2.13) and (2.14), the distribution
of industry solving this condition is:
sN =
sEN (1 − φ2) − φ(θ − φ)
(1 − φ)(θ − φ − sEN(θ − 1)(1 + φ))
. (2.15)



















σ , and p = 1, p∗ = τ
yields (2.11) and (2.12).
10which demonstrates the home market eﬀect, leading ﬁrms to be dispropor-
tionally represented in the economically larger region. Thus sN increases
more than proportionate to sEN for φ ∈ (0,1), and this eﬀect becomes
stronger as trade barriers are reduced (so-called home market magniﬁcation,
due to Krugman [1991]). This means that even if one region is just slightly
larger than the other, it will obtain the entire manufacturing industry if
transaction costs are suﬃciently low.
To illustrate the eﬀect of subsidies on the geographical equilibrium, dif-




sEN(1 − sEN)(1 + φ)2
(φ − θ + sEN(θ − 1)(1 + φ))2 < 0. (2.17)
(2.17) implies that the location of manufacturing activities in the North is
decreasing in net subsidies distributed to the South (and vice versa). By
setting sEN = 1
2 and diﬀerentiating (2.17) with respect to φ, it can be shown
that lower trade costs magnify the relocation eﬀect of the subsidy.
The welfare of a representative individual is a function of the income and
the price index prevailing in the region of residence. Given (2.2), the indirect
utility functions are (see Appendix A.1 for details):
VNk(θ) = ln(1 + a) +
 k
σ − 1
ln(sN + (1 − sN)φ), (2.18)
and
VSk(θ) = ln(1 + a) +
 k
σ − 1
ln(sNφ + (1 − sN)), (2.19)
for an agent of group k residing in the North and the South, respectively.
VNk > VSk if and only if sN > 1
2.7 Moreover, it is straightforward to verify
that
∂VNk
∂sN > 0 and
∂VSk
∂sN < 0. Consequently, individual welfare increases in the
number of ﬁrms located in the agents’ region, since this leads to a decrease
in consumer prices of manufactures when less industrial varieties need to be
imported, and trade costs have to be paid on a lower number of goods.
It can further be established that
∂VNk
∂θ < 0 and
∂VSk
∂θ > 0. Since θ has
an impact on industry location by (2.17), subsidies have an eﬀect on prices.
When ﬁrms relocate to the South (North) as θ increases (decreases), this
7VNk − VSk =
µk







> 0 if sN > 1
2.
11leads to a decrease in consumer prices of manufactures in the South (North),
which increases the individual welfare of the South (North). This accords
with the result of Dupont and Martin (2006) who show that more subsidies
allocated to the South (North), ﬁnanced at the national level, decreases real
income and the agglomeration of ﬁrms in the North (South). In other words,
changes in regional welfare are qualitatively symmetric: they change in the
opposite direction. That is, net subsidies distributed to the South, ﬁnanced
with a national tax, always decrease (increase) welfare in the North (South).
With the economic model speciﬁed, it is now time to introduce the polit-
ical game that aims at determining the direction and size of the net subsidy.
3 The Political Model
The political setting considered is a modiﬁcation of the model by Persson and
Tabellini (1999), which in turn is based on the probabilistic voting approach
adapted by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
3.1 The Basic Setting
Assume that the national elections involve the set of candidates, or parties,
{A,B}, which is ﬁxed and ﬁnite; candidates strive to maximize their vote
share or, alternatively, their probability of winning; candidates simultane-
ously choose the net subsidy level, θ; having observed the candidates’ plat-
forms, voters decide which candidate to vote for, and voting is costless. In
addition, the candidates’ commitments to their announced policy platforms,
ahead of the elections, are assumed to be binding.
Besides θ, the parties may diﬀer in some other dimension unrelated to
policy. This dimension is referred to as ideology, but it could also involve
other attributes such as the personal characteristics of the party leadership.
The ideological dimension is a permanent feature in that it cannot credibly
be modiﬁed as part of the electoral platform. Furthermore, by assumption,
voters diﬀer in their evaluation of this feature.
The population in region j consists of citizens belonging to diﬀerent elec-
toral districts indexed, in the same way as the voter groups, by k = R,M,P
(a citizen of district k is interchangeably referred to as a member of voter
group k).8 Each unit of labor is identiﬁed with a voter, hence the size
8It can be shown that all results generalize if groups and districts do not completely
12of the electorate is LW = LN + LS, where LN = lNR + lNM + lNP and
LS = lSR + lSM + lSP, and ljk represents the size of voter group k in region
j. lNk = lSkλ > lSk, since the North’s endowment of labor is λ > 1 times
the South’s endowment. Moreover, ljM > max{ljR,ljP} because the mid-
dle class is the largest voter group in region j. Recall that the total supply
of labor is ﬁxed, and that labor is immobile between the regions. Assume
that there is no income mobility among the electorate in region j, and deﬁne
lk ≡ lNk + lSk. This implies that lNk measures the size of voter group k in
the North relative to that of the South: when the electorate of group k in
the North increases, that of the South decreases, and vice versa.
At the time of the elections, voters base their voting decision both on the
policy announcements and on the two candidates’ ideologies. Speciﬁcally,









+ σijk + δ, (3.1)
where Vjk (θ) is given by (2.18) and (2.19). σijk is an individual-speciﬁc
parameter that can take on negative as well as positive values. It measures
the individual ideological bias towards candidate B of voter i in group k
residing in region j. A positive value of σijk implies that voter i has a bias in
favor of party B, whereas voters with σijk = 0 are ideologically neutral, i.e.,
they care only about regional policy. Assume that this parameter has regional
group-speciﬁc uniform distributions on:
h
− 1
2ζjk + ¯ σjk, 1
2ζjk + ¯ σjk
i
, where ¯ σjk
denotes the average ideology, and ζjk is the density of the distributions,
which captures the voters’ responsiveness to policy.9 Following Persson and
Tabellini (1999), label the three groups in region j according to their average
ideology: ¯ σjR < ¯ σjM < ¯ σjP, where ¯ σjM = 0 without loss of generality. This
means that the middle class in region j on average is ideologically neutral.
Thus two parameters, ¯ σjk and ζjk, fully characterize the distributions.
Speciﬁcally, voters diﬀer in their average ideology, captured by the means,
¯ σjk, and in their ideological homogeneity, a higher density, ζjk, being associ-
ated with a narrower distribution of σijk. Hence, ζjk measures the height of
the distributions, and how many votes are gained among the agents of region
j who belong to group k per marginal increase in their economic welfare.
overlap.
9The properties of the equilibrium do not change in a qualitative substantial way for
more general distributions of voters’ ideological preferences, namely if the group distribu-
tions of the parameter σijk are not uniform, but unimodal.
13The parameter δ, which captures the average (relative) popularity of can-









. As seen below, δ generates the required
uncertainty about the election outcome.
The timing of the political process is as follows. (1) The two candidates,
simultaneously and noncooperatively, announce their regional policy: θA and
θB. At this stage, they know the voters’ policy preferences. They also know
the distributions of σijk and δ, but not yet their realized values. (2) The
actual value of δ is realized and all uncertainty is resolved. (3) Elections are
held. (4) The elected candidate implements the announced policy platform.
To formally study the candidates’ decisions at Stage 2, the swing voter of
group k in region j is identiﬁed; that is, a voter whose ideological bias, given










where all voters i of group k in region j with σijk ≤ σjk prefer party A.
Hence, given the distributional assumptions, the vote share of candidate A
in group k of region j is:
̟A, jk = ljkζjk
￿





Since σjk depends on the realized value of δ, the vote share is also a
random variable. From both candidates’ perspective, the electoral outcome
is thus a random event, related to the realization of δ.
3.2 Proportional Elections
Consider the subsidy policy under an electoral rule where it is equally im-
portant to win votes in all voter groups. By assumption, there is perfect
proportional representation in the sense that the parties obtain a seat share
in proportion to their vote share in the entire population. Furthermore, the
party which obtains more than ﬁfty percent of the seats earns the right to
set policy according to its political platform.10 Under this electoral rule the
10For countries with proportional systems, more than two parties are usually observed.
However, the theory of probabilistic voting can be extended to multiparty elections, that
is, elections involving three or more parties. For example, Dorussen et al. (1997) show
that when the random component of voter decision making is suﬃciently large, the so-








̟A, Sk ≥ 3
!
. (3.4)
Without loss of generality, assume that
P
k ljkζjk¯ σjk = 0. Given (3.2),




















































A unique equilibrium exists in which both A and B choose the same θ.
Formally, they share the same ﬁrst-order conditions and do not themselves
have preferences over policy. It follows from (3.5) that the equilibrium policy
is a weighted mean of the regional voter groups’ individually optimal pol-
icy choices. The weights correspond to the group size, ljk, but also to the
densities of swing voters among group k in region j, ζjk, since the densities
summarize how responsive the diﬀerent groups are to regional policy; that
is, how they reward policy with votes at the elections.
Inserting (2.15) in (2.18) and (2.19), substituting the resulting expressions















It is straightforward to show that θPRO is increasing in ζSk and decreasing in
ζNk. Intuitively, ideologically neutral groups with many mobile voters, those
willing to swing their vote for small changes in regional policy, become an
called “minimum-sum point,” which minimizes the average distance between voters and
the parties’ positions, represents a convergent equilibrium. This generalizes the results for
two-party competition to the multiparty setting. However, very commonly, parties sort
themselves out before the elections into two party coalitions, each of which is vying for a
majority of the electorate. See for example Petterson-Lidbom (2008), who characterizes
the Swedish multiparty proportional system as bipartisan.
15attractive target for the oﬃce-seeking politicians. When the number of swing
voters increases in group k of region j, both parties allocate more subsidies
to k of j, because this voter group contains more responsive voters.
Following the assumption of Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2004), that
the population in the smaller region is relatively more ideologically homoge-
nous, i.e., assuming that ζSk > ζNk, it can be shown that the South is net
subsidized, θPRO > 1.
3.3 Majoritarian Elections
What if elections are instead conducted under plurality rule in one-seat elec-
toral districts? First, assume that the candidate that obtains ﬁfty percent
or more of the vote in a district gains the seat in the legislature. Then add
the following winning rule: earning the right to set policy requires winning
at least four seats out of the total of six. This setting can be interpreted
as a parliamentary election in which two competing parties ﬁeld candidates
running on the same platform in all six districts. The party winning in a ma-
jority of the districts has a majority in the assembly and can thus implement
its preannounced regional policy.
Following Persson and Tabellini (1999), suppose that the ideological bias
in the electorate towards party A in group R and towards party B in group P
is large enough so that the group-speciﬁc means, ¯ σjR and ¯ σjP, are suﬃciently
distant from zero. (The equilibrium restrictions on ¯ σjR and ¯ σjP are derived
in Appendix A.2) Then there exists an equilibrium with policy convergence,
where the entire political competition takes place in the middle-class districts.
Party A wins district R in region j with a large enough probability, and
loses district P with a large enough probability so that neither party ﬁnds it
optimal to seek voters outside the middle-class districts, since four districts
are required for winning the election. In this setting, the relevant expression
for the probability of candidate A winning is the probability that A wins

































(lNM + lSM), (3.7)
where ζM ≡ lNMζNM +lSMζSM. Compared to (3.5), this expression depends
16only on what takes place in the middle-class districts.
Using (2.15) in (2.18) and (2.19), inserting the resulting expressions into
(3.7) and substituting for lNM = lSMλ, then taking the derivative with re-






It can be shown that θMAJ is increasing in ζSM and decreasing in ζNM. The
intuition is the same as under proportional elections: increasing the number
of swing voters in the middle-class district of region j, increases subsidies
distributed to j.
Assuming that the electorate of the smaller region is relatively more ide-
ologically homogenous, i.e., ζSM > ζNM, implies that the South is net subsi-
dized, θMAJ > 1. This assumption is kept throughout the rest of the paper.11
4 The Comparative Political Economy Equi-
librium
4.1 The Subsidy Equilibrium
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ζNP . Hence, the South
obtains a relatively higher (lower) level of subsidies with majoritarian voting
compared to proportional voting, if the density of swing voters among the
middle-class relative to that of the rich and the poor is higher (lower) in
the South than in the North. Under a majoritarian system the electoral
competition is stiﬀer, because the candidates are relatively more focused on
the voter group with the least average ideological bias; that is, group M in
region j. Since the election outcome is more sensitive to policy, the middle-
class voters obtain a regional policy closer to their ideal point as compared
11It is a stylized fact that smaller regions tend to be more homogenous (Duranton and
Puga, 2000).
17to proportional representation. Such a policy has the same political beneﬁt
to the parties as under a proportional system, namely the marginal votes
gained among those who belong to group M in region j. However, the costs
are smaller, as the parties do not internalize the votes lost in group R and P
of region j. This implies that the larger (lower) is the density of ideologically
neutral voters in group M relative to R and P in the South compared to the
North, the larger (lower) are the regional transfers to the South under the
majoritarian rule; that is, θMAJ increases (decreases) relative to θPRO.
Now suppose that the density of swing voters of group k in the South
(North) is a fraction, αSk (αNk), of the electorate of group k in the South
(North), where αjk ∈ [0,1]: ζSk = αSklSk and ζNk = αNklNk = αNklSkλ.









The notion that the smaller region is characterized by a relatively higher
level of ideological homogeneity, with relatively more swing voters, is cap-
tured by the following correspondence: αSk ≡ αNklNk = αNklSkλ. This
expression holds for admissible values of αSk ∈ [0,1]. Outside the param-
eter space, αSk equals 1 in an obvious manner. This correspondence can
be motivated as follows. First, recall the argument made in Subsection 3.1,
that lNk measures the size of voter group k in the North relative to that of
the South: when the voters who belong to group k in the North increase,
those of the South decrease, and vice versa. Then note that the correspon-
dence implies that the density of swing voters of group k in the South, is
larger than that of the North by a factor proportional to the relative size of
the North’s endowment of labor: when the North becomes relatively larger,
the relative ideological homogeneity of the smaller region increases, as as-








αNP , that is, θMAJ > (<)θPRO if
lSM > (<)lSR and lSM > (<)lSP. Since ljM > max{ljR,ljP}, because the
middle class is the largest voter group in region j, θMAJ > θPRO holds.
Accordingly, both parties ﬁnd it politically optimal to allocate a relatively
higher (lower) level of subsidies to the smaller region under the majoritarian
(proportional) electoral rule. The relatively larger endowment of labor of the
North, and the fact that the middle class constitutes the largest voter group,
thereby including more swing voters, translate into a larger density of ideolog-
ically neutral voters in group M relative to R and P in the South compared
to the North. In other words, when the North becomes relatively larger, the
number of swing voters in the middle-class of the South increases by more
than the increase among the rich and the poor in the South. This gives rise
18to an ideological bias of the electorate in the smaller region, which increases
the political incentives to announce a relatively more favorable subsidy policy
towards the South (North) under majoritarian (proportional) representation.
4.2 The Location Equilibrium
Subtracting the distribution of industry under the proportional electoral rule





(θMAJ − θPRO)sEN(1 − sEN)(1 + φ)2
(θMAJ − φ − sEN(θMAJ − 1)(1 + φ))(θPRO − φ − sEN(θPRO − 1)(1 + φ))
,
(4.2)
where the denominator is positive, since by (2.17) the location of manufac-
turing activities in the North is decreasing in net subsidies distributed to the
South (and vice versa). (4.2) implies that sN(θMAJ) < sN(θPRO) because
θMAJ > θPRO. Thus, the equilibrium location of industry in the smaller
(larger) region is higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections. Intu-
itively, when the candidates allocate a relatively higher level of ﬁrm subsidies
to the South (North) under majoritarian (proportional) voting, the subsidy-
included relative return to capital increases in this region by the location
condition (πN = πSθ), which increases the number of ﬁrms located in the
South (North).
This is summarized in:
Proposition 1: The equilibrium location of industry in the South (North)
is higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections.
It followed from (3.6) and (3.8) that if the smaller region contains rela-
tively more swing voters, it is politically optimal to net subsidize manufac-
turing production in the South under both electoral rules. Moreover, it has
been shown that both candidates gain by distributing more (less) subsidies to
the South under the majoritarian (proportional) system. What implication
does this have for the location equilibrium as inter-regional trade is liberal-
ized? Figure 1 shows how the share of industry in the North changes as trade
barriers are reduced under both electoral rules, using the following parameter
19values: in accordance with the assumption that rich voters spend relatively
more of their income on industrial goods than the middle class and the poor,
let  R = 0.95, M = 0.9 and  P = 0.85;12 αNR = αNM = αNP = 0.2; lSM = 2
and lSR = lSP = 1; and sEN = 2/3 (i.e., λ = 2). For comparison, Figure
1 also displays as a dashed curve, the location equilibrium without voting,
denoted sN|θ=1, where no net subsidies are transferred (that is, where θ = 1),
also setting sEN = 2/3.




















Starting from autarky in Figure 1, the share of industry in the North
under proportional and majoritarian elections is monotonically decreasing as
trade is liberalized.13 Thus, when allowing for the endogenous determination
of regional policy, economic integration results in a shift of manufacturing
production to the region with relative factor scarcity. That is:
Proposition 2: When regional policy is determined by the political compe-
tition for votes, ﬁrms locate to the relatively smaller region as trade barriers
are reduced.
12µ = 0.9 is the average of the implied values estimated across U.S. counties 1970–1980
and 1980–1990 by Hanson (2005).
13Note that sN(θMAJ) < sN(θPRO) < sN|θ=1 at autarky, since θMAJ > θPRO > 1∀φ.
20For the parameter values assumed, when the government allocates a larger
share of net transfers to the South and trade is liberalized, the gain from pro-
ducing in the region hosting the larger number of consumers is less crucial for
the location decisions of ﬁrms. The beneﬁt for the manufacturing sector of a
government policy directed towards subsidizing the establishment of indus-
trial ﬁrms in the economically smaller region, outweighs the market-access
advantage of producing in the larger region. This eﬀect is more pronounced
in the case of majoritarian voting, since θMAJ > θPRO ∀φ. As a result, the
location of production shifts to the South at a relatively higher rate under the
majoritarian electoral rule. Therefore, as follows from Figure 1, the slope of
sMAJ
N is steeper than that of sPRO
N . At some point on the integration path the
South obtains the entire manufacturing industry. Consequently, the model
features a reversed core-periphery equilibrium. This equilibrium occurs for a
relatively lower level of regional integration with majoritarian elections. By
how much lower can be determined by using (3.6) and (3.8) in (2.15), set-
ting the resulting expressions to zero, solving for φ under proportional and










By inspection of (4.1) it follows that φPRO − φMAJ, which is shown in
Figure 1 as ∆, increases as θMAJ − θPRO increases: when the South obtains
relatively more (less) subsidies under the majoritarian electoral rule, ﬁrms
locate to the South at a relatively higher (lower) rate, producing a reversed
core-periphery equilibrium under majoritarian voting for a lower (higher)
level of economic integration.
This deﬁnes the political economy equilibrium. We now turn to an ex-
amination of the empirical properties of this equilibrium.
5 Empirical Framework
Using cross-country data, because national constitutional reforms are rare,
this section tests Proposition 1; that is, if the economically smaller (larger)
and rural (urban) region, i.e., the South (North), is relatively larger (smaller)
under majoritarian institutions compared to proportional elections (formally,
if sN(θMAJ) < sN(θPRO) holds). Proposition 2 is also tested, i.e., if economic
21activity shifts to smaller, more rural, regions as inter-regional trade is liber-
alized.
For the remainder of this section, the North (South) is referred to as the
urban (rural) region.
5.1 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcation
The data set consists of a cross-section sample of yearly averaged data over
the period 1993-2007 for 88 countries that can be considered as democracies.
(The countries are listed in Table 4 in the Appendix.)
A regression model of the following form is estimated with the continuous
variables expressed in natural logs:
urbc = α1 + α2majc + α3tcostc + α4zc + εc, (5.1)
where urbc is the level of the urban population to the total population of
country c.14 majc is a dichotomous variable taking the value of one if coun-
try c has a majoritarian or plurality electoral rule, zero otherwise.15 (See
Table 4 in the Appendix for a categorization of the countries in the sample
according to their electoral rule.) If Proposition 1 is correct, α2 is expected
to be negative; that is, the location of economic activity is relatively more
concentrated to rural areas under majoritarian institutions compared to pro-
portional elections. tcostc measures the land area in square kilometers of
14The theoretical dependent variable of interest in (5.1), s∗
N, denotes the share of in-
dustrial ﬁrms in the urban region. For data availability reasons, the share of ﬁrms in the
urban regions of country c is proxied by the share of people living in urban areas. As
pointed out by Venables (2005), other things being equal, it is more proﬁtable to produce
in a place with good market access with many consumers; thus, the population size of an
area shifts to the location of industry. Apart from this argument, population size is widely
used as a measure of the spatial distribution of economic activity (see for example Ellison
and Glaeser [1997]).
15A few countries in the sample undertook electoral reforms in the nineties. Japan (in
1994), New Zealand, the Philippines and Ukraine (all three in 1996) went from a plurality
system to a mixed system. Bolivia (1996), Ecuador (1996), Italy (1994) and Venezuela
(1993) all replaced full PR with mixed systems. Following the classiﬁcation of electoral
systems in Persson and Tabellini (2003), Japan is coded as 0.33, New Zealand as 0.67,
the Philippines as 0.89 and Ukraine as 0.8, while Bolivia, Ecuador, Italy and Venezuela
are coded as 0. All the results hold if Bolivia, Ecuador, Italy and Venezuela are coded as
0.5. Some other countries have parallel or segmented systems (Armenia, Georgia, Guinea,
South Korea and Lithuania). They are coded as 0.5. All the results hold if these countries
are excluded from the analysis.
22country c, thereby capturing internal distances. As in Ades and Glaeser
(1995), this variable is supposed to control for the domestic transportation
cost. If Proposition 2 is correct, α3 should be positive: as the transportation
cost decreases, economic activity shifts towards rural areas. α1 is an inter-
cept, and εc is an error term capturing omitted factors, where E(εc) = 0 for
all c.
zc represents a vector of six control variables, most of them applied in the
urban concentration model of Ades and Glaeser (1995). First, polityc, which
captures the institutional quality and the level of democratic development of
country c as measured by the Polity IV scores,16 with +10 being the high-
est level of democratic regime and -10 being the highest level of autocratic
regime.17 As Ades and Glaeser (1995) point out, there may be a negative
association between political instability and urban concentration. The rea-
son is that instability leads governments to protect themselves by moving the
seat of power from urban areas, thus lessening concentration, or by control-
ling migration (as for example in Stalinist Russia or Communist China) to
disperse population across space. The coeﬃcient estimate of polityc should
according to this view have a positive sign.
Second, the value added of the agricultural sector as a percent of GDP,
agric, as a proxy for the income of rural regions in country c, i.e., the market-
access advantage of rural areas. Theory predicts that a higher income of
agricultural regions decreases the incentives of relocating to urban centers; a
negative coeﬃcient is thus expected.
Third, real per capita GDP in USD, gdpc, to capture that the overall
demand is important for the concentration of economic activity and that
urbanization requires economic development; the parameter estimate should
have a positive sign.
Fourth, the share of trade in GDP, tradec, as a measure of the eﬀect
of openness on urban concentration. Following the argument of Ades and
Glaeser (1995), when trade protection is low, imported goods are a large
part of consumption. Imports are not cheaper in urban centers, so workers
spread over space to save on congestion costs. With protection, on the other
hand, domestic suppliers take over the market. Prices, net of transport costs,
16The Polity IV data is more comparable over time than the Gastil democracy index
(Persson et al., 2007). The Polity IV index is also used by Henderson and Wang (2007)
in their study of how democratization aﬀects the number and population size of cities.
17All results hold if the empirical analysis, as in Persson et al. (2007), is restricted to
countries with positive Polity IV scores.
23are lower for domestic goods in urban centers because ﬁrms are located in
those areas. Workers then migrate to these regions to pay lower prices for
domestic goods. Hence, according to Ades and Glaeser (1995), a less open
economy increases urbanization, which means that the coeﬃcient on tradec
should be negative.
Fifth, two dummy variables are included. An OECD dummy taking the
value of one if country c has been a member of OECD during a majority of
the sample period, zero otherwise. This variable controls for the fact that the
urbanization trend has been particularly fast in developed countries over the
past two or three decades (OECD, 2010). A South America dummy, thereby
taking into account that South America seems prone to urban concentra-
tion—three of the ﬁve most concentrated countries in the world are located
in South America. Both dummy variables should have a positive sign.
Data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, except
data on real GDP per capita, the share of trade in GDP, and information on
the electoral systems, which come from the Penn World Table Version 6.3
and the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the non-logarithmic continuous
variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Urban population (% of total): urbc 55.69 22.92 8.23 97.39
Transportation cost: tcostc 927,434 2,457,965 1,861 1.64E+07
Polity IV: polityc 6.88 3.41 -3.40 10
Agricultural value added to GDP: agric 15.64 15.30 1.16 69.93
Real GDP per capita: gdpc 13,243 11,689 430 45,334
Share of trade in GDP: tradec 79.27 35.90 21.83 194.76
5.2 Results
Table 2 shows the estimation results. As predicted by Proposition 1, α2 is
signiﬁcant and negative in all speciﬁcations; that is, rural (urban) regions are
relatively larger (smaller) under the majoritarian electoral rule. The coeﬃ-
cients indicate that countries with a majoritarian system on average have a
0.18–0.44 percent lower level of urban population to the total population com-
pared to countries with proportional representation. A back-of-the-envelope
24calculation shows that this implies an increase in the rural population as
a fraction of the total population of the average country in the sample by
36,000–89,000 inhabitants.
The coeﬃcient on tcostc is as expected signiﬁcantly positive. Thus, as
transportation costs decrease, economic activity shifts to rural areas, which
conﬁrms Proposition 2. This is an interesting result since empirical research,
not controlling for the electoral rule, ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of distance on
economic activity, i.e., a location disadvantage of rural areas as inter-regional
trade is liberalized (see for example Hanson (2005)). Comparing standardized
coeﬃcients, the transportation cost variable aﬀects the urbanization rate by
far more than the other continuous explanatory variables.
The positive coeﬃcient on polityc is consistent with the hypothesis of
Ades and Glaeser (1995), that political instability leads governments to pro-
tect themselves by lessening urban concentration. The coeﬃcient on agric
is negative and signiﬁcant, which gives support to the notion of a market-
access advantage of economically larger agricultural regions. The coeﬃcient,
however, loses its signicance when gdpc is included. This might reﬂect a high
multicollinearity between the income of rural areas and the overall level of
economic development. As expected, development, as measured by real per
capita GDP, is a signiﬁcant positive predictor of urbanization in all speciﬁca-
tions. tradec and the OECD dummy are not signiﬁcant, which could be due
to a high multicollinearity with gdpc: more developed countries trade more
than less developed countries; and more developed countries are members
of the OECD. The positive and signiﬁcant South America dummy indicates
that countries in this region are relatively more prone to urban concentration.
As a comparison with the eﬀect of the electoral system dummy coeﬃcient,
being a South American country increases the population of urban areas as
a fraction of the total population of the average country in the sample by
50,000 inhabitants.
As pointed out in note 15, these results are robust to an alternative
electoral classiﬁcation of the countries in the sample. The results are also
robust to an alternative cross-section set of 68 countries for the period 1960-
2007, excluding the former communist regimes.
25Table 2: OLS estimations of equation (5.1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
majc -0.374** -0.442*** -0.222* -0.191* -0.230** -0.228** -0.177**
(0.147) (0.139) (0.117) (0.101) (0.010) (0.101) (0.106)
tcostc 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.074** 0.077*** 0.083** 0.068**
(0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032)
polityc 0.091*** 0.050** 0.035** 0.034** 0.028**
(0.014) (0.200) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
agric -0.186** 0.141 0.133 0.113
(0.075) (0.174) (0.174) (0.184)








N 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.09 0.16 0.44 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.57
F 6.46** 9.13*** 22.48*** 18.20*** 17.10*** 14.47*** 12.95***
Notes: The dependent variable (urbc) is the level of the urban population to the total population of country c.
Robust standard errors in parentheses with *, **, and *** denoting signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively.
Most studies that attempt to estimate the eﬀect of constitutional fea-
tures on economic outcomes do not take into consideration that the selection
of a certain constitution is not random. Agents have induced preferences
over political institutions, since diﬀerent institutions generate diﬀerent poli-
cies, and thus lead to diﬀerent economic outcomes. This is emphasized by
for example Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) who show that income inequality
aﬀects the choice of the constitution: more unequal countries are expected
to choose majoritarian democracy, while equal societies should prefer pro-
portional representation. To the extent that the urban–rural divide reﬂects
income diﬀerentials in a country, the degree of urbanization should accord-
ingly aﬀect the probability of adopting a majoritarian system; that is, the
electoral rule is endogenous to the distribution of economic activity. To ac-
count for this simultaneity, an instrumental variable strategy is implemented
to re-estimate (5.1). To this we turn next.
265.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation
In their study on the eﬀects of electoral rules on the amount and the com-
position of government spending, Persson and Tabellini (2003) propose to
instrument for the election system with six variables. First, they use three
dating variables, indicating whether a country adopted its current form of
government and electoral rule between 1921-1950, 1951-1980, and after 1981,
with before 1921 as the omitted category. As they argue, the constitutional
inertia suggests the use of history to explain the cross-country variation in
constitutional rules. The idea is that there may have been waves in the type
of constitutions, where diﬀerent countries fell into diﬀerent waves depending
on when they adopted their constitution.
Second they apply three variables introduced by Hall and Jones (1999)
that capture European inﬂuence: two language variables, indicating the frac-
tion of the population in the country speaking one of the major European
languages, and the fraction speaking English as a native language; and lati-
tude (distance from the equator). Hall and Jones (1999) use these variables
as instruments for the overall quality of institutions. The argument is that
countries with a greater fraction of the population speaking European lan-
guages and those farther from the equator, which were less densely populated
and geographically more similar to Europe, hence more conducive to Euro-
pean migration, have beneﬁted from a European inﬂuence. Based on this
theory, Persson and Tabellini (2003) reason that language and latitude could
have aﬀected the form of electoral rule adopted.
Acemoglu (2005) questions the validity of these instruments, and shows
that the constitutional dating variables are weakly correlated with the elec-
toral rule. Once the second-stage covariates applied by Persson and Tabellini
(2003) are included in the ﬁrst-stage regression, the constitutional dummies
are no longer jointly signiﬁcant for the majoritarian dummy. Hence, with
only timing dummies, there is no ﬁrst stage for the instrumental variable
strategy—an indication of a weak instruments problem. Furthermore, Ace-
moglu (2005) argues that the Hall-Jones instruments are unlikely to be valid
for the overall quality of institutions, since no historical evidence supports
the theory that European inﬂuence was generally beneﬁcial to institutional
development. And even if these instruments were valid for the overall quality
of institutions, there is no reason to think that they would be appropriate for
speciﬁc features of the institutional structure such as the electoral rule. By
excluding other determinants of institutions from the second-stage regres-
27sion of economic outcomes, their approach creates a bias similar to omitted
variables bias.
Acemoglu’s (2005) critique notwithstanding, whether the constitutional
timing variables are weak instruments within the framework of the current
paper is ultimately an empirical question. Therefore, I tentatively propose
the use of the constitutional dating variables as instruments for the electoral
rule.
The exclusion restriction implied by this instrumental variable strategy is
that, conditional on the controls included in the regression, the constitutional
dating variables, denoted con2150, con5180 and con81, have no eﬀect on the
level of urban population, other than their eﬀect through the electoral rule.
(See Table 4 in the Appendix for a categorization of the countries in the
sample according to the timing of the adoption of their constitutions.) To
test this restriction, they are added as exogenous regressors. OLS regressions
of urbc on the timing dummies show that they indeed are insigniﬁcant. Thus
the impact of these variables likely works through their eﬀect on the electoral
rule. Moreover, there are good reasons to suspect that the historical period
in which the current constitution was established, is exogenous to the level
of urbanization during the period 1993-2007. To determine whether the
instruments have suﬃcient explanatory power, an F-test of the hypothesis
that they do not enter the ﬁrst stage regression of (5.1) is performed. Taking
into account the critique of Acemoglu (2005), and contrary to the approach
of Persson and Tabellini (2003), this ﬁrst stage includes the second-stage
covariates.
Table 3 reports the IV estimation of (5.1). The F-test rejects the null
hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the ﬁrst stage regression—the
constitutional dating variables are jointly signiﬁcant, and con2150 and con81
are individually signiﬁcant at the ten and ﬁve percent level, respectively.
As in the OLS model, the coeﬃcient on majc, α2, is signiﬁcantly negative,
providing support for Proposition 1: countries with majoritarian elections
have a 0.68 percent lower level of urban population to the total population
compared to proportional democracies. This translates into an increase in
the population of rural regions as a fraction of the total population of the
average country in the sample by 136,000 inhabitants, indicating that the
OLS estimators may be biased downwards.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on tcostc once again conﬁrms
Proposition 2, that the economic activity shifts to rural areas as trade bar-
riers are reduced. Moreover, as expected, gdpc is positive and signiﬁcant,
28which is consistent with the notion that the overall demand is important
for the concentration of economic activity, and that urbanization requires
economic development. It can also be veriﬁed that the estimated location
eﬀect of a one standard deviation change in tcostc is far more economically
signiﬁcant than the corresponding change in gdpc.
The null hypothesis of the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions,
that all instruments are valid, cannot be rejected; and a Hausman test for
the endogeneity of the electoral rule, the null hypothesis being that it is ex-
ogenous, is not rejected. The implication is that there is insuﬃcient evidence
to conclude that the instruments are not valid, or that the OLS estimates
are biased and inconsistent.
Table 3: IV estimation of (5.1)
majc tcostc polityc agric gdpc tradec OECD South America
-0.676* 0.100** 0.019 0.210 0.415** 0.039 0.015 0.025
(0.403) (0.050) (0.015) (0.232) (0.193) (0.144) (0.179) (0.230)
N 88 F 3.23***
R2 0.45 χ2 0.44
Sargan 5.94
Notes: The dependent variable (urbc) is the level of the urban population to the total population of country
c. Robust standard errors in parentheses with *, **, and *** denoting signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. F is the test statistic of the hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the ﬁrst stage
regression. χ2 is the Hausman test statistic for endogeneity, a test of the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences between
the OLS estimates and the IV estimations. Sargan is the test of over-identifying restrictions, the hypothesis
being tested is that the instrumental variables are valid.
6 Conclusions
The new economic geography literature suggests that regional policy aﬀects
the location decisions of ﬁrms, while the research on comparative political
economy links diﬀerent electoral rules to diﬀerent economic policy outcomes.
Combining these approaches, this paper has analyzed how the endogenous
determination of the distribution of ﬁrm subsidies under proportional and
majoritarian elections aﬀects the equilibrium location of manufacturing pro-
duction.
It has been shown that the smaller region obtains a relatively higher
(lower) level of subsidies with majoritarian (proportional) voting. The North
29has a relatively larger endowment of labor, which gives rise to relatively more
swing voters in the South. Given that the middle class constitutes the largest
voting group, this creates an ideological bias in the electorate of the smaller
region, with a larger fraction of ideologically neutral voters in the middle
class in the South compared to the North. As a result, both parties ﬁnd
it politically optimal to distribute a higher (lower) level of subsidies to the
South under the majoritarian (proportional) electoral rule, which increases
(decreases) the number of ﬁrms in this region.
When trade is liberalized, subsidies to manufacturing production become
relatively more eﬃcient in attracting industrial activity. Since the smaller
region is net subsidized under both electoral rules, this implies that the equi-
librium location of industry in the South is increasing in the level of economic
integration. Consequently, as trade is liberalized, the economy eventually
features a reversed core-periphery equilibrium where all ﬁrms reside in the
South. However, since the South obtains a relatively higher (lower) level of
subsidies with majoritarian (proportional) voting, ﬁrms locate at relatively
higher (lower) rates to the smaller region as trade costs are lowered under
this electoral rule. Hence, the reversed core-periphery equilibrium occurs
for a relatively lower (higher) level of regional integration with majoritarian
(proportional) representation.
Empirical evidence from a cross-section sample of 88 countries supports
the theory that smaller and rural (larger and urban) regions are relatively
larger (smaller) under majoritarian institutions compared to proportional
elections. The empirical framework has also conﬁrmed the prediction that
economic activity shifts to economically smaller, more rural, regions as trade
is liberalized. These results are robust to an instrumental-variable strategy
where, following the literature on constitutions and ﬁscal policy outcomes,
the electoral rule is instrumented by the timing of the adoption of the national
constitution.
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33A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of (2.18) and (2.19)
The indirect utility function of a representative agent in group k residing in








. Using w = 1,
ρWKW =
xWKW
σ +TLW and normalizing LW to unity without loss of general-







σ = πNnN+πSnS. Substituting (2.10) into






Ej = 1 + a. (A.1)








= (nN + nSφ)
−µk










= (nNφ + nS)
−µk
σ−1 = (sNφ + (1 − sN))
−µk
σ−1 . (A.3)
Substituting (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) into the indirect utility function and
taking the logarithm of the resulting expression to obtain (2.18) and (2.19).
A.2 Existence of a Majoritarian Equilibrium: Restric-
tions on ¯ σjk =M
Existence of a majoritarian equilibrium requires that candidate A does not
want to seek victory in district P of region j. Party A is already winning
district R with a higher probability than district M, which candidate A wins
with 50 percents probability in the proposed equilibrium.
Let a tilde denote a deviation by party A to district P of region j. A













M) is the exogenous utility of candidate A from holding district
P (M) in the North and the South.
In equilibrium, both candidates announce the same policy. By the deﬁ-
nition of ˜ P A






− ψ¯ σjP. (A.5)














Existence of a majoritarian equilibrium also requires that candidate B
does not want to seek victory in district R. Party B is winning district P
with a higher probability than district M, which candidate B wins with 50
percents probability.
Let a tilde denote a deviation by party B to district R. A deviation does
not pay for B if:










Similar calculations, as above, show that the following condition insures
that party B does not want to deviate from the proposed equilibrium, either:












35Table 4: Electoral rules and timing of the adoption of the constitution
Country majc con2150 con5180 con81 Country majc con2150 con5180 con81
Argentina 0 0 0 1 Liberia 0 0 0 1
Armenia 0.5 0 0 1 Lithuania 0.5 0 0 1
Australia 1 0 0 0 Macedonia 0 0 0 1
Austria 0 1 0 0 Madagascar 0 0 0 1
Belgium 0 0 0 0 Malawi 1 0 0 1
Benin 0 0 0 1 Malaysia 1 0 1 0
Bolivia 0 0 0 1 Mali 1 0 0 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 1 Mauritius 1 0 1 0
Brazil 0 0 0 1 Mexico 0 0 0 1
Bulgaria 0 0 0 1 Montenegro 0 0 0 1
Burundi 0 0 0 1 Namibia 0 0 0 1
Canada 1 0 0 0 Nepal 1 0 0 1
Chad 1 0 0 1 Netherlands 0 0 0 0
Chile 1 0 0 1 New Zealand 0.67 0 0 0
Colombia 0 0 1 0 Nicaragua 0 0 0 1
Comoros 1 0 0 1 Nigeria 1 0 1 0
Costa Rica 0 1 1 0 Norway 0 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 1 Panama 0 0 1 0
Cyprus 0 0 1 1 Papua New Guinea 1 0 1 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 1 Paraguay 0 0 0 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0 Peru 0 0 1 0
Ecuador 0 0 1 0 Philippines 0.89 0 0 1
El Salvador 0 0 0 1 Poland 0 0 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0 1 Portugal 0 0 1 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 Russia 0 0 0 1
France 1 0 1 1 Sierra Leone 0 0 0 1
Georgia 0.5 0 0 1 Slovak Republic 0 0 0 1
Germany 0 1 0 0 Slovenia 0 0 0 1
Ghana 1 0 0 1 Solomon Islands 1 0 1 0
Greece 0 0 1 0 Spain 0 0 1 0
Guatemala 0 0 0 1 Sri Lanka 0 1 1 0
Guinea 0.5 0 0 1 Sweden 0 0 0 0
Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 1 Switzerland 0 0 0 0
Guyana 0 0 1 0 Tanzania 1 0 1 0
Honduras 0 0 0 0 Thailand 0 0 1 0
Hungary 0 0 0 1 Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 1 0
India 1 1 0 0 Turkey 0 0 0 1
Ireland 0 1 0 0 Uganda 1 0 0 1
Italy 0 1 0 0 Ukraine 0.8 0 0 1
Jamaica 1 0 1 0 United Kingdom 1 0 0 0
Japan 0.33 0 1 0 United States 1 0 0 0
Kenya 1 0 0 1 Uruguay 0 0 0 1
Korea, Republic of 0.5 1 0 0 Venezuela 0 0 1 0
Latvia 0 0 0 1 Zambia 1 0 0 1
Notes: Some countries adopted their constitution before 1921. As for the constitutional dating variables, these
countries are the omitted category and coded as 0.
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